

S FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS 1871-1914

c-aris on which we can defend ourselves before they reach the Rhine." The Glacis speech of 1874 was grist to the mill of the French propagandists* who seized on it as a confession that Berlin had no interest in the happiness or welfare of the modulations. Yet at this very moment the provinces were conceded a Diet of thirty members, in which the so-called Autonomists, led by Schneegans, a Strassburg journalist, for some years played an active though unpopular part.

In 1875 the nerves of Europe received a formidable shock.¹ At the end of February the Chancellor was informed that France was ordering a large number of cavalry horses in Germany, and, after forbidding their export, he wrote for explanations to Hohenlohe. The Ambassador replied that France had no present intention of war, but that all parties hoped to reconquer the provinces when she found allies. War was neither near nor distant: nobody could say. A few days later, on March 12, the French Chamber, outstripping the proposals of the Government, increased the battalions in a regiment from three to four. The German Staff calculated that the increase would be 144,006, which would make the French army larger than their own. " This means an attack very shortly," observed Moltke to the Belgian Minister; " we must not wait till they are ready." Opinion was genuinely alarmed. " Fakes vous forts, tres forts," remarked Gortchakoff to the French Ambassador. Bismarck, he added, saw the hand of France in everything. On April 5 the *Kolnische Zeitung* expressed its fear of a Franco-Austrian alliance with the backing of the Pope and a clerical Monarchy in France. On April 8 the *Post* published an article headed " Is War in sight ? " which created the first dangerous crisis since 1871. War, it

declared, was in sight, for France was preparing a war of revenge, but it was still possible that the clouds might disperse. It was widely believed that the article was inspired by the Chancellor; but the supposition was unfounded, for it was written by Rossler on his own responsibility. Bismarck told Hohenlohe that he was surprised by the article, but he welcomed it as calculated to awaken Germany to the danger and to frighten France. On April 11 the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* declared that, though the fears of the *Post* in regard to

¹ J. V. Fuller, « The War-Scare of 1875, » *American Historical Review*, January 1919. states the case against Römmler v. Witzfelde, *Deutsch-französische*